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Abstract— Poisoning attack is identified as a severe security
threat to machine learning algorithms. In many applications,
for example, deep neural network (DNN) models collect public
data as the inputs to perform re-training, where the input data
can be poisoned. Although poisoning attack against support
vector machines (SVM) has been extensively studied before, there
is still very limited knowledge about how such attack can be
implemented on neural networks (NN), especially DNNs. In this
work, we first examine the possibility of applying traditional
gradient-based method (named as the direct gradient method) to
generate poisoned data against NNs by leveraging the gradient
of the target model w.r.t. the normal data. We then propose
a generative method to accelerate the generation rate of the
poisoned data: an auto-encoder (generator) used to generate
poisoned data is updated by a reward function of the loss, and
the target NN model (discriminator) receives the poisoned data to
calculate the loss w.r.t. the normal data. Our experiment results
show that the generative method can speed up the poisoned
data generation rate by up to 239.38× compared with the direct
gradient method, with slightly lower model accuracy degradation.
A countermeasure is also designed to detect such poisoning attack
methods by checking the loss of the target model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning has been widely used in information
processing to help users understand the underlying property of
the data. The example applications include image classification
and recognition, feature extraction, language processing, video
analysis and etc. As one of the major types of machine
learning models, NN processes input data by multiplying
them with layers of weighted connections. NNs have been
deployed to a large variety of embedded systems to offer
machine intelligence, where the NNs need to collect input
data to perform re-training. For example, a small-footprint
large vocabulary speech recognizer for mobile devices [12],
a small robust deep-learning model designed to provide high
quality text-to-speech functionality on smart devices [3], and
an audio sensing framework built from coupled DNNs [4].
Such applications, however, introduce at least two types of
security issues – causative attack and exploratory attack [1],
[8].
Exploratory attack does not change the parameters of the
target model. Instead, the attacker sends new data to the target
model and observes the model’s decisions on these carefully
crafted input data. One recent example of exploratory attack is
adversarial example [15], [7]. The authors show that DNN can
be fooled by adding small perturbations onto the inputs even
though these perturbed inputs can still be easily recognized
by humans. No parameters of the NN are changed during the
attack. Another recently proposed exploratory attack scheme
leverages the model’s transfer learning ability to replicate the
target model without the prior knowledge of its parameters
and structure [17].
On the contrary, causative attack allows attackers to ma-
nipulate training dataset in order to change the parameters
of the target model and reconstruct it. One important type of
causative attack is poisoning attack where artificially poisoned
data are sent into the target model with attacking labels. The
target model then updates itself with the poisoned data and
gradually compromises. Several schemes have been proposed
to conduct poisoning attack against SVMs [2], [16]. However,
we have not seen many works about poisoning attacks against
NNs. One possible reason may come from the vague mathe-
matic understanding of NN. In a NN, for example, there is no
explicit direct expression of gradient calculation as the gradi-
ents are updated during backpropagation. This fact prevents
gradient-based poisoning attack from being deployed in NNs
where the second partial derivative needs to be calculated.
In this work, we first examine the possibility of applying
traditional gradient-based direct gradient method to generate
the poisoned data against NN. We then propose a generative
method to speed up the generation rate of the poisoned data by
bypassing the gradient calculation, which is the bottleneck in
the direct gradient method. The proposed scheme is partially
inspired by the concept of Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN) [6]: An autoencoder (generator) is used to generate
the poisoned data and updated by a reward function of loss,
and then sends the poisoned data to a discriminator. The
target NN model (discriminator) receives the poisoned data
and calculates the loss w.r.t. the normal data, and then sends
the calculated gradients back to the generator. We also design a
reward function and a strategy of sending back the gradients.
Different from a traditional method that periodically checks
the accuracy of the model [13], we also propose a loss-
based method to detect poisoning attack with much lower
computation overhead. The proposed countermeasure is based
on the fact that a normal input only introduces a small loss
since it is close to the original decision region, while a
poisoned input usually incurs a large loss as it is far away
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from this region. Hence, we are able to distinguish the types
of the input by checking this loss difference.
Our major contributions can be summarized as:
• We examine traditional gradient-based poisoning attack
on NN and identify the poisoned data generation rate as
the bottleneck of its implementation;
• Based on our examination, we propose a generative
method to substantially speed up the poisoned data gen-
eration rate with slightly degraded model attack effective-
ness, i.e., target model accuracy degradation;
• We proposed a loss-based countermeasure to detect the
poisoning attack with very minimum overhead;
• The effectiveness of the proposed schemes are extensively
evaluated by performing experiments on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets under different configurations.
II. RELATED WORK
The security attacks against learning algorithms can be
mainly categorized into two types: exploratory attack (ex-
ploitation of the classifier) and causative attack (manipulation
of training data) [1], [8] Poisoning attack belongs to the latter
type and has been investigated in many prior arts.
One of the earliest studies on poisoning attack was per-
formed on design of anomaly detector [14]. The author showed
how an attacker can substantially increase his chance to
evade the detection by only introducing moderate amounts of
poisoned data to the detector. A PCA-based detector was also
proposed based on the fact that poisoning attack significantly
distorts the model produced by the original PCA method. A
similar work was presented in [9].
There are many existing works about poisoning attack
against SVM, thanks to its clear mathematic basis. In [2],
the author proposed a gradient ascent strategy in which the
gradients are computed based on properties of the SVM’s
optimal solution. In learning algorithms, gradient calculation is
the basis of many optimization problems, such as the training
of NNs using gradient backpropagation. It also inspired the
schemes proposed in our work. In [16], the author studied
optimizations of label flipping attack – another version of
poisoning attack. Label flipping attack is interpreted as a linear
programming problem, which can be solved by approximating
the original problem with a simpler problem. Although the
demonstrated solutions are effective, their applications may
be limited due to the specific target model.
A systematic, algorithm-independent poisoning attack ap-
proach was presented in [13]. The proposed attack procedure
is able to generate the poisoned input data based on only the
distribution of training data. However, the author gives neither
the proof of why the method works nor how to ensure the
effectiveness of the proposed approach.
III. POISONING ATTACK AGAINST NEURAL NETWORKS
A. Notations
In this manuscript, we use xi and xp to denote the normal
data and the poisoned data, respectively. Here, the subscripts
i and p indicate the variables of the normal data and the
poisoned data, respectively. We also use superscripts (o) and
(p) to indicate the variables of the original model and the
poisoned model, respectively. For example, L(p)i (t) is the loss
of the poisoned model w.r.t. the normal data, where t is
the time stamp. In the work, the entire parameter set of the
original model is expressed as w(o) while w(o)k denotes only
the parameters of layer k. ϕ() is the activation function, e.g.,
hyperbolic tangent (Tanh) or rectified linear unit (ReLU).
B. The Attacking Process
Causative attack allows an attacker to arbitrarily manipulate
the input dataset of the model, such as adding, changing, and
removing some of the input data. As one type of causative
attack, we assume that poisoning attack allows the attacker to
insert arbitrary data xp with artificial label tp into the training
dataset.
Here we assume the attacker has already known the details
of the original NN model, including the network structure and
the exact weight values. Although the attacker may not directly
modify the model, he may still be able to poison the input
training data to compromise the model, i.e., to degrade the
model’s accuracy.
Assuming we already have a method to generate the poi-
soned data, the poisoning attack process can be formulated as
below:
Step 1: Generate the poisoned data xp using the given
method;Step 2: Inject xp into the original model w(o) to produce
w(p);Step 3: Send the normal data xi into w(p) to get some useful
information, e.g., loss and gradients from different
time stamps;Step 4: Based on the information obtained in Step 3, update
the configurations and parameters of the method of
poisoned data generation;Step 5: Repeat the procedure from Step 1.
C. The Data Gradient and Direct Gradient Method
The goal of poisoning attack is to minimize the accuracy
of the target model w(o) by injecting poisoned data xp.
Mathematically, this goal is the same as maximizing the loss
of the model w.r.t. the normal data xi. When the target model
adopts the mean square error (MSE) or cross entropy as its
loss function, the goal of poisoning attack can be respectively
represented by
max
xp
L(xp) =
n∑
i=1
1
2
||ϕw(xi)− ti||2; or (1)
max
xp
L(xp) = −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
1{t == j} log p(t == j|xi;w),
(2)where ti is the label corresponding to xi.
As indicated in Eqs. (1) and (2), the maximum feasible
solution in the loss space can be obtained by calculating
gradients w.r.t. xp and adopting the gradient ascent procedure.
In this subsection, we will show the mathematical deduction of
these gradients in NNs, regardless of the actual loss function.
The procedure is depicted in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1: An overview of direct gradient method.
First, we train a NN based on the existing training data
xi and obtain the original model w(o). Its corresponding loss
L
(o)
i w.r.t. xi can be calculated through a forward process on
w(o), such as
xi
w(o)−−−→ L(o)i . (3)
Next, the poisoned data xp and its corresponding label tp
are injected. There are many ways to choose the initial xp,
e.g., sampling from a uniform distribution with an arbitrary
label or randomly choosing from one of the normal data
with an incorrect label (e.g., the label that to be attacked).
We then calculate the loss L(o)p , update the network to w(p)
through backpropagation with the newly calculated gradients,
and obtain the loss L(p)i as:
xp
w(o)−−−→ L(o)p , (4)
w(p) = w(o) − α ∂L
(o)
p
∂w(o)
, and (5)
xi
w(p)−−−→ L(p)i . (6)
Finally, we need to calculate the derivative of the sum of
L
(p)
i w.r.t. xp,
∑ ∂L(p)i
∂xp
, and then update the poisoned data
along the direction of the gradient using a pre-determined
coefficient x′p = xp+α
∑ ∂L(p)i
∂xp
. Here ∂L
(p)
i
∂xp
can be expanded
using the chain rule and expressed as the multiplication of
multiple derivatives, such as
∂L
(p)
i
∂xp
=
m∑
k=1
∂L
(p)
i
∂w
(p)
k
∂w
(p)
k
∂xp
, (7)
∂L
(p)
i
∂w
(p)
k
= o
(i)
k−1
T
δ
(i)
k , (8)
∂w
(p)
k
∂xp
=
w(o) − α ∂L
(o)
p
∂w(o)
∂xp
= −α ∂
2L
(o)
p
∂w(o)∂xp
, and (9)
δ
(i)
k =

(o
(i)
k − tk) ◦ o(i)k ◦ (1− o(i)k ) if k is an output layer
w
(p)
k+1δ
(i)
k+1 ◦ o(i)k ◦ (1− o(i)k ) if k is an inner layer.
(10)
Here δ(i)k represents the sensitivity of the neurons in layer k
to the loss. o(i)k = ϕ(wkok−1) represents the output of the
neurons in layer k. ◦ is the Hadamard product.
The term
∂2L(o)p
∂w(o)∂xp
in Eq. (9) is a second partial derivative.
However, it it difficult to calculate this term with an explicit
formula or a backpropagation-alike method because both the
first derivatives
∂L(o)p
∂w(o)
and
∂L(o)p
∂xp
are complex functions of each
other.
Algorithm 1 Direct gradient method.
Input: Training dataset Dt, validation dataset Dv , attacking class
tp, generating rate α, threshold of loss Lth.
Preprocess:
1. Initialize and train the network w(o) with normal training data
xi in Dt. Choose an initial poisoned data from Dt as xp(0) and
change its label to Ta. Reset the round number t = 0 and the
initial loss
∑
L
(p)
i (0) = 0.
repeat
2. Inject xp(t) to w(o) and update the network to w(p);
3. Input xi to w(p), compute the sum of loss
∑
E
(p)
i (t);
4.
for k = 0; k <length of xp(t); k + + do
Add a small amount ∆x to xp(t)(k);
Inject xp(t)(k) to w(p) and calculate L
(p)
i (k);
Calculate L
(p)
i
xp
(k) =
L
(p)
i (xp(t)(k)+∆x)−L
(p)
i (xp(t)(k))
∆xp(t)(k)
;
end for
5. Update xp(t+ 1) = xp(t) + α · sign(∑ L(p)ixp (k));
6. t = t+ 1;
until |∑L(p)i (t)−∑L(p)i (t− 1)| < Lth
Output: Poisoned data xp(t) with label tp.
Instead of calculating from Eq. (7)-(10), we propose to
directly compute L
(p)
i
xp
=
L
(p)
i (xp+∆xp)−L(p)i (xp)
∆xp
based on its
definition. Algorithm 1 summarizes the poisoned data genera-
tion process of the direct gradient method that is based on our
proposed L
(p)
i
xp
=
L
(p)
i (xp+∆xp)−L(p)i (xp)
∆xp
calculation approach.
Here the attacker is provided with a training dataset to generate
the target model and the poisoned data. The attacker is also
provided with a validation dataset for testing. The selection
of the initial poisoned data will be discussed in Section IV in
details. The key of our proposed algorithm is to respectively
calculate the gradient w.r.t. each element of xp, which will
be summed up to a combined gradient L
(p)
i
xp
. As a result, xp
is updated by multiplying the direction of the gradient, i.e.,
sign(
L
(p)
i
xp
), with a coefficient α. The change rate α can be
fixed at a pre-determined value (e.g., α = 0.1) or adaptively
change in the process.
As we shall present in Section IV, the poisoned data
generated by direct gradient method can effectively degrade
the accuracy of the target model. However, the data generation
can be very time-consuming because of the element-wise
gradient calculation. Very importantly, the computation cost
of the poisoned data generation in direct gradient method
is proportional to the dimension of the input data and the
complexity of the target model. Hence, the scalability of direct
gradient method may be a severe issue, especially considering
the rapid growth of the sizes of the popular NNs and their
training datasets.
D. A Generative Method to Accelerate Poisoned Data Gener-
ation
Inspired by the concept of GAN [15], we propose a gener-
ative method which can bypass the costly gradient calculation
and therefore speed up the poisoned data generation.The key
of our method is to train an extra model to generate xp. The
gradients of the target model (the first derivative derivation)
are sent to the extra model and update the model (another
first derivative derivation) in order to generate the new xp.
Therefore, the second partial derivative is implicitly calculated.
We name the original target model as discriminator (D) and
the extra model as generator (G). In this work, we choose a
general autoencoder as our generator. As a feature extractor,
the autoencoder understands the fundamental ingredient of the
original pattern, thus changes it from a smaller (compressed)
dimension compared with the original one. The gradients and
loss from the discriminator will be collected and calculated
to guide the training of the generator. Figure 2 illustrates the
overview of the proposed generative method for poisoned data
generation. The generator is used to generate poisoned data
and updated by a weighted function of the loss and the gra-
dients, and then sends the poisoned data to the discriminator.
The discriminator receives the poisoned data and calculates
the loss w.r.t. the normal data, and then sends the calculated
gradients back to the generator. The structure of the generator
is designed as 784-200-200-784 for MNIST dataset, which
will be adopted in some experiments in Section IV.
Algorithm 2 formulates the detailed steps of the generative
method. We assume the same prerequisites of the direct
gradient method are provided for the attacker, except for a
pre-trained autoencoder serving as a generator. The initial
data is sent into the generator in the first step to generate
poisoned data, which is then injected to the target model. The
gradients of the target model w.r.t. the normal data
∑ ∂L(p)i
∂xi
are collected, and the obtained weighted gradients are used
to update the generator. In this way, we no longer have to
calculate the direct gradients L
(p)
i
xp
element-wisely and only
one update of target model is needed in each iteration. As a
result, the time consumption of poisoned data generation is
greatly reduced, especially when the target model is complex.
784 200 784
𝒙𝑝(𝑡 − 1) 𝒙𝑝(𝑡)
𝒙𝑖
𝐺
Controller
200
𝒘(o)
𝒘(𝑝)(t)
𝑓(𝐿𝑖
(𝑝)
, 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡)
Generator
Discriminator
Fig. 2: An overview of the generative method.
Algorithm 2 Generative method.
Input: Training dataset Dt, validation dataset Dv , attacking class
tp, generating rate α, threshold of loss Lth.
Preprocess:
1. Initialize and train the network w(o) with normal training data
xi in Dt. Choose a starting poisoned data from Dt as xp(0) and
change its label to Ta. Train an autoencoder-based generator G
to generate xp. Set the round number t = 0 and the initial loss∑
L
(p)
i (0) = 0.
repeat
2. Input xp(t) to w(o), update the network to w(p);
3. Input xi to updated network w(p), compute the sum of loss∑
L
(p)
i (t) and the gradients
∑ ∂L(p)i
∂xi
;
4. Update G with the weighted gradient
f(
∑ ∂L(p)i
∂xi
,
∑
L
(p)
i (t),
∑
L
(p)
i (t− 1));
5. Update the poisoned data xp(t) to xp(t+ 1) via G;
6. t = t+ 1;
until
∑
L
(p)
i (t)−
∑
L
(p)
i (t− 1) < Lth;
Output: Poisoned data xp(t) with label tp.
One critical problem here is how to design the gradients
for the generator. We propose to use the difference of two
losses from two consecutive attacks to build a reward function.
Combing this difference with the gradients of the target model
w.r.t. the normal data, we can obtain a weighted gradient for
the generator. The reward function suggests if this update is a
good one while the gradients of the target model determines
the detailed directions of the weighted gradient. If the update
is not a good one, it will be punished.
E. The Loss-based Countermeasure against Poisoning Attack
Moreover, we propose an universal method to detect the
aforementioned poisoning attack methods, which is shown in
Algorithm 3. Once a data (no matter normal or poisoned) is
injected into the target model, the loss of the target model is
recorded. If the loss exceeds the pre-determined threshold Lth,
a warning will show up. If the number of warnings exceeds the
threshold Wth, the accuracy check will be triggered to examine
if a poisoning attack is indeed being conducted. Our method
is based on the phenomenon that the poisoned input and label
pair usually results in a larger loss, compared with the normal
one. This is naturally understandable as the goal of poisoning
attack is to minimize the model accuracy, which is realized
through maximizing the loss. The poisoned data alters target
model’s original decision boundary. On the contrary, normal
data stays inside the decision region (at least most of time),
inducing a relatively smaller loss. We are able to monitor the
condition of inputs by checking the loss periodically. This
approach, hence, is much computational less extensively.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
We examine the poisoned data generation process on two
datasets – MNIST [11] and CIFAR-10 [10]. We compare the
target model accuracy degradation and the time consumption
of the direct gradient and the generative attack methods. We
also evaluate the feasibility of the loss-based countermeasure
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(a) Start from normal data “5” by applying the direct gradient method.
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(b) Start from a uniform distribution sampling by applying the direct gradient method.
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(c) Start from normal data “5” by applying the generative method.
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(d) Start from normal data “bird” by applying the generative method.
Fig. 3: The process of poisoned data generation under different configurations.
technique against poisoning attack. All the experiments are
performed on GeForce GTX 1080 GPU platform.
A. The Effectiveness of Poisoning Attacks Against NN
Two widely used datasets, MNIST and CIFAR-10, are used
to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed poisoning attack
method. We choose MXNet [5] as our deep learning library.
The target model for MNIST is a two-layer feed-forward
neural network with a structure of 784-64-10. Its original
recognition accuracy is 96.82%. We use Lenet [11] that
consists of two convolutional layers and two fully-connected
layers as the target model for CIFAR-10, of which the original
accuracy is 71.20%. We did not stress the fine-tuning when
obtaining these original target models, as the phenomenon of
the poisoning attack requires continuous model re-training. To
better demonstrate the data generation process, we conduct the
single poisoning attack, that is, injecting one poisoned data per
attack.
Figure 3 demonstrates a few poisoned data generation
processes of selected sample images. Starting from a normal
initial data follows the intuitive thinking – setting the label of a
normal data to an incorrect class could compromise the model
by making it learn in a wrong way. Figure 3(a) applies the
direct gradient method to a normal digit 5 image in MNIST
with a wrong label 6. As the impact from gradients accumu-
lates, the generated poisoned image gradually transforms to a
pattern alike “5” until convergence. Figure 3(b) starts from a
random data sampling from a uniform distribution with label 6,
where the direct gradient method is used. It serves as a control
experiment to understand if any preference in the poisoned
data generation. It is interesting that the random data ends as
a fuzzy image close to “6”. The observation is different from
our initial thought that the converged pattern should be very
unlike the attacking class, i.e., “6” in this example. This could
possibly be explained as a pattern with a similar structure but
very different features to the normal one will compromise the
learning process the most.
Algorithm 3 Loss-based poisoning attack detection.
Input: Training dataset Dt, validation dataset Dv , loss threshold
Lth, warning recorder Rw = 0, warning threshold Wth.
Preprocess: 1. Train the network with Dt.
while true do
2. Send in training data x (no matter normal or poisoned);
3. Forward process, calculate the loss L;
if L > Lth then
4. Record a warning, Rw = Rw + 1;
end if
if Rw > Wth then
5. Calculate the accuracy with validation dataset Dv;
if it is abnormal then
6. Set attack alarm to true, AA = 1, break;
else
7. Nothing is wrong, clear the warnings, Rw = 0;
end if
end if
end while
Output:Attack alarm AA.
Figure 3(c,d) demonstrates the poisoned data generation
process when applying the generative method. For the normal
digit 5 image in MNIST with label 6 in Figure 3(c), the
generative method shows a similar result as the direct gradient
method. It is hard to identify the exact converged pattern of the
bird image labeled as cat from CIFAR-10. This is because the
data in CIFAR-10 has a much larger dimension than MNIST’s
(3,072 vs. 784).
The direct gradient method leverages the loss of the poi-
soned model w.r.t. the normal data
∑
L
(p)
i . Therefore, the
group size of the normal data (or, group size) that is used to
calculate
∑
L
(p)
i has a strong influence on the convergence
speed of the poison data generation and thus the attack
effectiveness. More specific, large group size provides a more
general consideration of the entire dataset, alleviating the
impact of some particular data. The typical group size is 100
in this work. 10 and 1000 are used as references.
Figure 4 shows detailed comparisons of the group size and
the initial data selection for MNIST dataset. The blue lines
represent the accuracy of the poisoned model and the red line
denotes the average loss of the model w.r.t. the normal data
group. As can be seen from the figures, the loss increase and
the accuracy degradation of the normal initial data (solid lines)
are much faster than the trend of random initial data (dashed
lines). The results imply that normal initial data is a better
choice than the random one.
In the figure, the first point of a line refers to the result of the
original target model, while the second point corresponds to
that of the model poisoned by the initial data. The performance
degradation at the second point indicates that normal or
random initial data could comprise the target model, but the
effectiveness is far from enough. For example, the accuracy
of the second iteration is ∼70% when the group size is 100.
Comparing the accuracy degradations in three sub-figures,
we note that the curve obtained from a larger group size
is more stable than that of a smaller group size. When
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(a) Group size = 1000.
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(c) Group size = 10.
Fig. 4: The trend of the loss and accuracy of the direct gradient
method under different group sizes for MNIST dataset.
starting from a random data, the larger group size also results
in smaller converged accuracy. Generally speaking, a larger
group size has a better attack effectiveness but also introduces
more computation overhead. Detailed performance comparison
shall be presented and discussed in Section IV-B.
The normal initial data of the small target model designed
for MINIST dataset converges at ∼10%. In reality, regularly
continuous re-training process for a neural network in a
much larger scale could alleviate the attack. So we may not
obtain such a significant accuracy degradation in the poisoning
attack. Even though, the results prove the effectiveness of our
proposed methods and suggest potential study prospect.
B. Direct Gradient vs. Generative Methods
We compare the direct gradient and the generative methods
for the two datasets with the normal initial data, under three
group size settings (1000, 100, 10). Here, the structure of
TABLE I: The comparison of the direct gradient method and the generative method on time, accuracy, and loss.
MNIST CIFAR-10
GENERATIVE GRADIENT IMPROVE GENERATIVE GRADIENT IMPROVE
1000
TIME (S) 3.88± 0.68 345.85± 10.50 89.14× 14.40± 1.14 3447.8± 83.55 239.38×
ACCURACY (%) 16.59 8.84 0.53× 20.74 20.51 0.99×
LOSS 13.67 13.32 0.97× 7.34 4.37 0.60×
100
TIME (S) 3.41± 0.98 36.18± 3.13 10.61× 11.69± 1.46 580.70± 17.44 49.67×
ACCURACY (%) 17.03 9.64 0.57× 20.88 20.91 1.00×
LOSS 12.37 12.97 1.05× 5.73 4.45 0.78×
10
TIME (S) 3.84± 0.60 4.18± 0.91 1.09× 12.56± 0.77 259.60± 6.56 20.67×
ACCURACY (%) 16.41 9.67 0.62× 23.40 20.81 0.89×
LOSS 14.75 15.39 1.04× 5.54 5.48 0.99×
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Fig. 5: The loss difference between normal and poisoned
losses.
the autoencoder used as the generator for MNIST is 784-
200-200-784. The generator for CIFAR-10 is a deeper fully-
connected autoencoder with 6 layers. Table I summarizes the
comparison in terms of the average time to generate one
poisoned data (TIME), the least accuracy achieved by the target
model (ACCURACY), and the largest average normal data loss
achieved of the data group (LOSS). The improvement of the
generative method over the direct gradient method (faster time,
lower accuracy, and higher loss) are also presented in the table.
The best result of each metric under each dataset is marked
as bold.
According to the table, the direct gradient method costs
more time than the generative method especially as the group
size increases. For MNIST dataset, the generative method con-
verges at a higher accuracy (i.e., the worst case is 16.59% vs.
8.84%) which is still in a reasonable range. This phenomenon
is due to the fact that we use a small network on a small
dataset, and the accuracy degradation converges too fast for
generative method. For the bigger dataset CIFAR-10, the two
methods show the similar accuracy levels. It implies that the
generative method has a better scalability and works better for
larger neural networks. Moreover, the time cost of the direct
gradient method has a strong dependency on the group size
while it is not observed in the generative method. In summary,
the generative method is more effective and expects to have
a great potential in poisoning attacking larger neural network
models and bigger datasets.
C. Evaluating The Proposed Poisoning Attack Detection
As mentioned in Section III, poisoned data deviates the
decision boundary of the target model and aggravate its loss.
Hence, periodically monitoring the loss anomaly appears to be
an effective way of detecting poisoning attack. For the MNIST
dataset, we measure the difference between the normal loss
and the loss introduced by poisoning attack (or, poisoned loss)
and show the result in Figure 5. The horizontal axis represents
different randomly selected input data with artificial labels.
The vertical axis denotes the normalized loss incurred by re-
training the target model on these data. Each point on the
vertical axis is bind with the above two losses. A clear gap
exists between the least poisoned loss and the largest normal
loss. This is even true if we choose the input data from a
uniform distribution which is the worst case without human
interference. The result proves the feasibility of our proposed
poisoning attack detection method.
Moreover, the loss of the target model is usually calculated
during re-training. Implementing the proposed poisoning at-
tack detection technique in Algorithm 3, therefore, requires
marginal extra computation and hardware overheads. It is
impossible to completely prevent poisoning attack since no
one can learn right from wrong. However, we could extend
the monitor mechanism to other parameters and criteria of the
model to provide a fast alarm system which can invoke the
poisoning attack detection in time.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the general process of poisoned
data generation for neural networks (NNs). We propose two
poisoning attack methods against NNs, including a direct
gradient method and a generative method. We also develop
a preliminary countermeasure that performs a loss-based poi-
soning attack detection. Experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-
10 show that the generative method can substantially improve
the poisoned data generation rate compared with the direct
gradient method. Particularly the former one demonstrates
great potential in attacking large neural network models and
big datasets. Our future work will focus on designing a better
generator and gradient policy that can achieve both improved
poisoned data generation rate and model attack effectiveness.
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